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Napolitano: Child’s Right to Education

CHILD'S RIGHT TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE
EDUCATION
New York ConstitutionArticle Xf, Section 1:
The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and

support of a system of free common schools, wherein all
the children of this state may be educated.
FAMILY COURT OF NEW YORK

ERIE COUNTY
In the Matter of Kevin M. 1
(decided March 12, 2001)

Kevin M. was born on January 21, 1993 and had been in
the current foster care placement .for twenty-two months.2
During a January 19, 2001 hearing to determine the
discontinuation of parental visitation, it was discovered that Kevin
was not attending school, had manifested serious psychological
problems, and was not receiving psychological or psychiatric
treatment A court appointed psychological evaluator testified at
the hearing that Kevin identified his foster home as a permanent
home, and wished to be called "Michael Doe" .4 In a subsequent
February 27, 2001 foster care status review hearing, Kevin's law
guardian introduced testimony from his counselor, caseworker
and foster mother on the issues of Kevin's emotional well-being
1187 Misc. 2d 820, 724 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Fam. Ct. Erie County 2001).
823, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
3Id. at 820, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
4 Id. Since Kevin viewed his foster mother, Lorie Doe, as his "real"
mother, he insisted on being called "Michael Doe" and did not perceive this
placement as a foster home.
2Id. at
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and education. 5 Despite testimony related to Kevin's overall
improvement, the family court ordered that Kevin M. have
immediate access to therapeutic services of a licensed
psychologist and to commence attendance at regular school.6
Kevin and his sister were placed in separate foster care
due to the abuse sustained at the hands of their mother.7 Kevin
was described as a timid child who took steps to disguise himself
due to his extreme fear that his biological mother would
"kidnap" him.8 Kevin was diagnosed with Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"). 9 His foster mother homeschooled Kevin due to the ADHD. 10 While Mrs. Doe had no
teaching credentials, Kevin was expected to take a standardized
test at the end of the year.11 Pertaining to his socialization, Kevin
participated in Awana (a Christian version of Boy Scouts), Oasis
(a Christian drama and choir group), church activities and a
secular indoor soccer league.1 2 Despite these attempts at
socialization, the evidence clearly demonstrated that Kevin was
not receiving the special education or therapeutic intervention he
required. 13 However, the law guardian argued that Kevin
considered his foster home his permanent home and identified his
foster family as his "real" family. 14 Moreover, it was shown that
a Social Services employee made an improper comment to his
foster parents that there was "zero chance" Kevin would be

Id. at 829, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
M., 187 Misc. 2d at 830, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
7 Id. at 821, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
8 Id. at 821-22, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
Dr. Eloise O'Brien, a licensed
6Kevin

clinical psychologist, appointed to conduct a psychological evaluation of
Kevin, testified that Kevin wore "jingle bells to bed at night and has shaved
his head and wears glasses in order to be unrecognizable" to his biological
mother to protect himself from being kidnapped by her.
9 Id. at 823, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
10 Id. at 824, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
" Kevin M., 187 Misc. 2d at 824, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
12

id.

"aId.at 825, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
14 Id. at 822, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
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returned to his biological parents,
thus, further enabling this
15

inappropriate bond to continue.

Handicapped children are not a "suspect class," nor is the
right to education classified as a fundamental interest 16 under
federal standards. With no specifically enumerated right in the
United States Constitution, Congress sought to address the issue

of education for handicapped children by enacting the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). 17 The basic purpose
of the IDEA is to ensure that children with disabilities receive
special education and related services designed around their
specific and unique needs.'S The Act provides federal money to
qualified states to assist in the education of handicapped children.
To qualify, a state must demonstrate that it has in effect a policy

assuring the right to a "free appropriate public education" to all
handicapped children.19 Yet, the statute does not contain any
language that describes a substantive standard of the level of
education required for these children. 20 In fact, legislative
15 Id.

San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, (1973).
20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1997).
18 Bd. of Educ. of the Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Schultz, 137 F. Supp. 2d
83, 89 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). This case arises from a dispute wherein the parties
were unable to agree on a proposed individualized education program (IEP)
prepared for Kevin Schultz, a student with a learnifig disability. The Schultzes
requested an impartial hearing on the grounds that die district failed to offer
Kevin a free appropriate public education. Subsequently, they removed him
from the public school and enrolled him at a private school and sought tuition
reimbursement. The district court ordered that the district was required to
continue to reimburse the Schultzes for the cost of tuition during the pendency
of the dispute.
'9 20 U.S.C. § 1412, stating in pertinent part, "A state is eligible for
assistance under this subchapter for a fiscal year if the State demonstrates to
the satisfaction of the Secretary that the State has in effect policies and
procedures to ensure that it meets each of the following conditions: (1) Free
appropriate public education."
20 Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v.
Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 189 (1982). This case arose when the petitioners challenged the
individualized education program (lEP) prepared for their daughter, Amy
Rowley, a deaf student. Petitioners sought to have a sign.-language interpreter
in Amy's classes, but the school administrators decided an interpreter was
unnecessary. Thus, pursuant to the Education of the Handicapped Act (also
16
17
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history confirms that Congress' objective was merely to assure
that public education was available to handicapped children and
not to guarantee any level of substantive education. 2 In Board of
Education v. Rowley,22 the Supreme Court read the legislative
intent of the IDEA as not requiring states to provide specialized
educational services to handicapped children that would be
commensurate with opportunities provided other children.23
Justice Rehnquist wrote in the Rowley opinion:
The requirement that States provide "equal"
educational opportunities would thus seem to
present an entirely unworkable standard requiring
impossible measurements and comparisons.
Similarly, furnishing handicapped children with
only such services as are available to
nonhandicapped children would in all probability
fall short of the statutory requirement of "free
appropriate public education"; to require, on the
other hand, the furnishing of every special service
necessary to maximize each handicapped child's
potential is, we think, further than Congress
intended to go. Thus to speak in terms of "equal"
services in one instance gives less than what is
required by the Act and in another instance more.
The theme of the Act is "free appropriate public
education," a phrase which is too complex to be
captured by the word "equal" whether one is
speaking of opportunities or services.24
The opinion further elaborates:

known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), judicial review is
permitted after exhausting all administrative reviews. Both the district court
and the New York Court of Appeals concluded that the IEP did not meet Amy

Rowley's educational needs and held that the Act required the provision of a
sign-language interpreter. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

at 192.
458 U.S. 176 (1982).
Id. at 198.
24 Id. at 198-99.
21 Id.

22
23
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[T]he Court of Appeals thus erred when they held
that the Act requires New York to maximize the
potential of each handicapped child commensurate
with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped
children. Desirable though this goal might be, it is
not the standard that Congress imposed upon States
which receive funding under the Act. Rather,
Congress sought primarily to identify and evaluate
handicapped children, and to provide them with
access to a free public education. 25
However, pursuant to the New York State Constitution, a
child's interest in receiving an adequate education is
constitutionally enumerated. 26
At the 1894 Constitutional
Convention, the Education Article was adopted assuring
"minimal acceptable facilities and services" which, as interpreted
by the highest court in New York, implies "a sound basic
education" .27 The New York Court of Appeals in Board of
Education, Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist 28
"recognized a duty on the Legislature to ensure the availability of
a sound basic education to all the children of the State." 29 Article
XI of the New York State Constitution mandates that "[ t] he
legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
21

Id. at 200.

Kevin M., 187 Misc. 2d at 827, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 315, 655
N.E.2d 661, 665, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565, 569 (1995). Plaintiffs, a not-for-profit
corporation, brought a declaratory action claiming that the: state's public school
financing system is unconstitutional under the Education. Article of the State
Constitution, the Equal Protection Clauses of the State and Federal
Constitutions, the Antidiscrimination Clause of the State Constitution and is
unlawful under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the United States
Department of Education's regulations implementing Tilie VI. New York's
Court of Appeals reinstated the cause of action based upon a violation of the
New York Constitution and the Education Article, as well as the alleged
violations of the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and State
Constitutions and remanded. All other claims were dismissed.
2 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982).
29 Campaignfor Fiscal Equity, 86 N.Y.2d at 315, 655, N.E.2d at 665, 631
N.Y.S.2d at 569, (citing Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 48, 439 N.E.2d at 369, 453
N.Y.S.2d at 652.)
26
27
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system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this
state may be educated." 30 Pursuant to section 3212(2)(d) of the
New York State Education Law, proof must be furnished that a
child who is not attending a public school is attending a private or
Without such proof, it is presumptive
parochial school. 3 '
evidence that the child is not attending school and makes out a
prima facie case of educational neglect. 32 Moreover, New York
State Education Law § 3204 (4-a) 33 provides that "[e]very pupil,
having been determined to be a 'child with a handicapping
condition' by a committee on the handicapped, shall be offered an
opportunity to receive benefits of an appropriate public
education." 34 This committee will "identify, review and evaluate
at least annually, the status of each child with a handicapping
condition... and to make recommendations to the child's legal
custodian and the Board of Education as to appropriate
Moreover, foster
educational programs and placement." 3 5
parents are obligated by the New York State Department of
Social Services, in accordance with Title 18, section 443.3(b) of
the New York State Department of Social Services Regulations, 36
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
3' N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3212 (2)(d) (McKinney 2001), which provides,
"IS]hall furnish proof that an individual who is not attending upon instruction
at a public or parochial school in the city or district where the person in
parental relation resides is attending. upon required instruction elsewhere.
Failure to furnish such proof shall be presumptive evidence that such
individual is not attending."
32 Kevin M., 187 Misc. 2d at 827, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 822, (quoting Matter of
Christa H, 127 A.D.2d 997, 513 N.Y.S.2d 65 (4th Dept. 1987)).
33 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3204 (4-a. Special Education) (McKinney 2001).
34 Kevin M., 187 Misc. 2d at 830, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
31 Id. at 829, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 822 (citing N.Y. Educ. Law § 4401 (2)).
36 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 443.3 (b), provides in pertinent
part,
Certified and approved foster parents must execute an
30

agreement ...

[that they] will: (1) enable children received

at board to mingle freely and
children in the household and
accepted as members of the
pleasures and responsibilities;

on equal footing with other
in the community and to be
household and share in its
(2) arrange for children of
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to provide socialization with other children in the community and
to have the advantages gained from regular school attendance. 37
The Kevin M. court recognized that Kevin was entitled to
protections afforded by § 3204, and ordered the prompt
evaluation of his disability and an individualized education
program ("IEP") be formulated and implemented.38 These
recommendations were to be presented to Kevin's legal
custodian, The Erie County Department of Social Services, as
well as the Board of Education.39

A state has the power to impose reasonable regulations for
basic education.40 Absent a fundamental right, such as religious
beliefs affirmed in Wisconsin v. Yoder, or some other liberty
interest rooted in the Federal Constitution, a state's interest in
universal compulsory education is strong.41 Mrs. Doe's assertion
that Kevin's ADHD was the reason for home schooling was
insufficient to renounce a child's right to a formal education.
Clearly a special needs child, Kevin may take advantage of

professional educational intervention42 pursuant to section 4402

school age to attend school regularly as required by the
Education Law ....
3 Kevin M., 187 Misc. 2d at 828, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
38 Id. at 829-30, 724 N.Y.S. at 823.
'9 Id. at 831, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
40 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972). Wisconsin's compulsory
school-attendance law required children to attend publiic or private school until
the age of sixteen. Respondents, members of the Amish community charged
with violating the compulsory school attendance statute, alleged that the statute
violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Amish
objection is rooted in religious concepts whereby the values taught by a high
school education is in direct contrast to the Amish values and their way of life.
Amish children grow in their faith and their relationship to the Amish
community during their adolescence and are prepared for adult baptism into
the Amish community. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the
charges; the Wisconsin Circuit Court affirmed the convictions and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed based upon the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.
41 Id. at 215.
42Kevin
M., 187 Misc. 2d at 829, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
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(2) (a) of the Education Law.43 In conjunction with the education
laws, regulations by the New York State Department of Social
Services create obligations upon foster parents to enable children

placed in foster homes to socialize with other children in their
community. 4 The court found that Kevin's isolation, both with
regard to his education and community socialization, were
contrary to regulatory direction and clearly not in his best
interests. 45

The Supreme Court has recognized that a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause exists for the
right of parents to "establish a home and bring up children" and
"to control the education of their own." 46 Twenty-one years
after its decision in Meyer v. Nebraska,47 the Court confirmed in
Prince v. Massachusetts48 the right of parents to decide on the
upbringing of their children as a right of constitutional dimension:
"It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nature of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither

43 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4402(2)(a) (McKinney 2001), states in pertinent part,

"The board of education or trustees of each school district shall be required to
furnish suitable educational opportunities for children with handicapping
conditions

. .

." Section 4402(1)(b)(1) states in pertinent part, "The board of

education or trustees of each school district shall establish committees and/or
subcommittees on special education as necessary to ensure timely evaluation
and placement of pupils." Section 4402(2) states,
Such committees or subcommittees shall identify, review and
evaluate at least annually, the status of each child with a
handicapping condition and each child thought to be
handicapped who resides within the school district. Such
review shall consider the educational progress and
achievement of the child with a handicapping condition and
the child's ability to participate in instructional programs in
regular education.
44 Kevin M., 187 Misc. 2d at 828, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
45 Id.
46 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
47 262 U.S. at 390.
4' 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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supply nor hinder. , 49 Given this significant precedent, there can
be no doubt that the United States Constitution protects the
fundamental right of parents in directing the future of their
children. 50 Against this backdrop of constitutional rights, the
Kevin M. court while, at the same time, hearing motions on the
termination of parental rights admonished the Department of
Social Services for their failure to rehabilitate Kevin's mother for

the eventual reunion of mother and child. 51 So firmly rooted 52
is
cases
Court
Supreme
of
number
a
that
"family,"
of
concept
the
have defined family as: "[flirst, the usual understanding of
"family"

implies biological relationships, and most decisions

treating the
relation between parent and child have stressed this
53

element. "
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged
"that the right of a parent, under natural law, to establish a home
and bring up children is a fundamental one." 54 Thus a second

and equally important issue raised by the Kevin M. court is
whether it can be said that the relationship between foster parents
and a foster child rise to the level of what is recognized as a
"family," thus permitting foster parents to decide the educational
future of foster children. 55 While a biological relationship is not
Troxel, 530 U.S at 65-66, (citing Prince, 321 U.S. at 166); see also
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972).
'0 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
51 Kevin M., 187 Misc. 2d at 830, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
52 See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645; Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
53 Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
(1977) (citing Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651).
54 In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n of N.Y., 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E. 2d 700,
183 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959). Habeas corpus proceeding to determine custody of
an infant placed in a foster home at the time she was one year old. For four
years the foster parents actively sought to adopt the child despite the refusal by
the child's biological mother. The trial judge ordered that 'in the best interests
of the child' she be taken from the foster parents. Both the appellate division
and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.
" Smith, 431 U.S. at 842.
49
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present in a foster family, a child who has been with foster
parents since infancy develops strong emotional, loving and
interdependent attachments. 56 These familial bonds promote a
way of life and fulfill socializing functions, as would a natural
family. 57 However, there are important differences between a
natural family and a foster family.58 Foster families have their
roots in a contractual arrangement between the state and the
family. 59 This arrangement eliminates any right to family privacy
60
Without the liberty
recognized by our Federal Constitution.
interest of family privacy, a foster parent cannot stand in an in
loco parentis61 relationship making legal, e.g. educational-type
decisions, for a foster child.62 More importantly, state agencies
retain legal custody of foster children and agency supervision
sends a clear message to foster parents that they do not have the
full authority of a legal custodian.63 Moreover, natural parents
retain legal guardianship and the right to act with respect to the
56

1d. at 844.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59 Id.
60 Smith, 431 U.S. at 844.
61 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 542 (6th ed. 1991) defines in loco
parentis as
with a
factitiously,
charged,
of
a
parent;
instead
of
a
parent;
the
place
"[in
exists
when
parentis"
"Loco
and
responsibilities.
parent's rights, duties,
supervision
of
such
in
absence
of
another
care
and
control
person undertakes
by latter's natural parents and in absence of formal legal approval, and is
temporary in character and is not to be likened to an adoption which is
permanent."
62 Andrews v. County of Otsego, 112 Misc.
2d 37, 41, 446 N.Y.S.2d 169,
172 (Sup. Ct. Otsego County 1982). Plaintiff voluntarily surrendered her
infant son to the Otsego County Department of Social Services. While the
infant was in the custody of foster parents, he sustained an eye injury. Suit
was brought on behalf of the infant child against the foster parents and the
Department of Social Services for negligent supervision. The foster parents
moved for a dismissal claiming that an infant child does not have a cause of
action against a parent for the negligent failure to supervise and as foster
parents they should be treated as natural parents. The court concluded that
public policy supports a cause of action for negligent supervision against foster
parents and denied their motion to dismiss.
63 Smith, 431 U.S. at 827.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss2/3

10

Napolitano: Child’s Right to Education

2002

CHILD'S RIGHT TO EDUCATION

child in certain circumstances. 64
The foster parent-child
relationship is designed to be temporary, merely providing a
stable environment with the benefits of a family setting, until the
child can return to its biological parents or be permanently placed
in an adoptive home.65 Additionally, it is well established that
New York courts have "admonished foster parents against
conducting themselves in a manner inconsistent with their
responsibility to prepare the child for eventual return to the
parental home." 66
In summary, New York, vis-k-vis New York State
Constitution, has created a right to education despite the fact that
there is no corresponding federal constitutional right. The closest
the federal government has come to creating such a right is
through the enactment of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act that provides federal money to states to assist in
the education of handicapped children. While states need to
demonstrate that a policy assuring the right to a free appropriate
public education is in place, the Act falls short of mandating any
substantive standard level of education.
This federal quasi-right of education and absolute right
under the New York State Constitution cannot be reconciled with
the Supreme Court's observation in Parham v. J.R. :67 "[mlore
4 Id.
65

People v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Serv., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 387, 386

N.E.2d 235, 238, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 629 (1978). An infant's natural mother
placed him in a temporary placement while she contemplated the surrender of
the child for permanent adoption. Four days after his birth he was placed with
appellants on a foster care basis. Upon receiving the mother's surrender of the

child, the Department of Social Services notified the foster parents of their
intent to remove the child from their care for the purpose of permanent
placement. Appellants sought adoption of the child, but were denied by the
department. Delays in litigation resulted in the child remaining with the foster
parents for two years. Appellants sought protection under Subdivision 3 of
section 383 of the Social Services Law, which provides that foster parents who
have cared for a child continuously for two years may apply to adopt the child
and are entitled to be given a preference over all other adoption applicants.
The supreme court denied the application for adoption. Both the appellate
court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
66
67

Kevin M., 187 Misc. 2d at 825, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
Id. at 682.
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important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children." 68 It is understood that foster parents are only
"temporary parents" and merely because of the provisional
nature of the relationship, they are precluded from making
decisions beyond the day-to-day supervision of the child. 69 Thus,
without the federal constitutional protection of family privacy or
religious belief, foster parents are unable to assert the
indisputable liberty interests of care, custody and management of
a child, as afforded a biological parent.7 ° Consequently, a state's
interest ensuring that children are provided a public education
supersedes decisions by foster parents; yet remain subordinate to
those of the biological parent. 7' The Yoder court notably quoted
Thomas Jefferson, who said early in our history, "some degree
of education is necessary to prepare our citizens to participate
effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are
to preserve freedom and independence.
Further, education
prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient
participants in society." 7 2 For foster children, whose early lives
may be burdened by abuse and neglect, education and
socialization can be extremely beneficial, and more importantly,
in the best interests of the child.
Donna A. Napolitano

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 602) (emphasis
added).

69 Smith, 431 U.S. at 827.
70 Kevin M., 187 Misc. 2d at 828, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
71 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
71 Id. at 221.
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